De Anima

This is a very interesting text because it seems that Aristotle is pretty confident he can outline what a soul is and its many qualities. This is all based on the fact that the soul must lie in the body because it is inseparable. One cannot move the soul separate from the body, so any movement of the body is a movement of the soul. So he spends the first book of De Anime going through various Presocratic views of the soul, which because the soul moves it self must be the primary substance whether that be water, fire, air, or something else. Throughout this book I kept expecting him to assert his own view, but he was just trying to present all the views that don't work so in the second book he can start a completely new view of the soul from scratch.

Roochnik: Aristotle

We find here that although Aristotle is a student of Plato, he greatly differs in his relationship with the Presocratics and their study of nature. Whereas Plato is primarily considered with studying logoi, of what human beings have to say, he studies nature, but he also takes the influence of Plato with him by including Forms and his concern for the best possible human life. He took these forms and brought them down to earth and although they still bear the weight of objective truth they are not ontologically separate from particulars. So Aristotle's view of forms will definitely be explored throughout this chapter of Roochnik. It is structured where first he addresses Aristotle's conception of nature, second will discuss his psychology, and the final two sections will treat Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics and his Politics, the works he most directly developed the legacy of Platonism.

What he means in saying "Of beings, some are by nature, while others are by other causes" is that some beings move themselves, in the sense of the Presocratics arche (first principle) in that I am the origin of my own movement. No external force needs to be applied to me because I have desires and move toward what I want, although I can be affected by external forces. A sort of change is the self-originated natural motion he is referring to, such as decay or growth or my hair turning grey. For change to be natural though it must emmanate from a living being, so the example he gives is the construction of a house and the wear and tear and repair it goes through over time. All of its change is due to external forces. Whereas my aging may have some alterations due to external forces, but it all stems from inside me. But it isn't just living things that he refers to as natural. He also talks of simple bodies which are earth, fire, air, water and each of these lifeless bodies have a principle of motion and rest in themselves. For example without other force fire and air would move upward toward its natural place in the heavens above whereas earth and water would move downward.

From all this we can see that Aristotle's worldview is a "Cosmos", a limited, hierarchical organized world where its center is the earth and its zenith is in the perfectly circular orbit of the fixed stars. One aspect I found really interesting here is the four causes which I had not previously heard of. So we have the "material cause" which answers the question what is this made of, then the "formal cause" which answers what is it, the efficient cause which answers what moved or produced it (this is closer to our modern day view of cause), and "final cause" is something's goal, purpose or end (telos) and it answers what is it for (his example is health which is understood as the 'end' of walking. So we can say that these causes are an indicator of the way we speak about causes and from Aristotle's perspective a good grasp of the reality of causes.

So this is the general sort of scope for his conception of nature that I was given starting out with Roochnick, but the rest of his chapter on Aristotle dives into his Ethics and Politics which are interesting and only somewhat helpful to my final project.

Aristotle's Categories

So I began reading Categories and immediately realized that it is the most confusing ancient text I have read in a while. At least Plato had nice dialogues that had some humor. Luckily, that link you sent me Rubarth helped immensely. One particular thing I don't really grasp right away is when he talks about 'accidental' and 'non-accidental'. "Beings that are present-in others are accidental, while those that are not present-in others are non-accidental." That is from the website not the text. So if you could help me understand that one part that would be wonderful.

Classifications:
(1) accidental universals; (2) essential universals; (3) accidental particulars; (4) non-accidental particulars

Studtmann's distinction of universals and particulars is debated, although it is accepted by Aristotle's Medieval interpreters, by G.E.L. Owen. "Owen argues, a being that is not said-of but present-in primary substances is an accidental universal of the lowest possible generality." I am not sure what Owen means by this. This distinction still seems really vague to me and not very well mapped out.

So for the rest of Categories, Aristotle discusses his ten-fold distinction of 'what is said', which also distinguishes as words. But in that webpage you sent me they argue that he is more concerned about objects in this world because Aristotle explicitly accepts a doctrine of meaning according to which words conventionally signify concepts, and concepts naturally signify objects in the world, so he is ultimately driven by his concerns of objects of this world.

The Ten Categories he creates is as follows: Substance (essence or substance), Quantity (how much), Quality (of what kind or quality), Relation (toward something), Place (where), Time (when), Position (to lie), State (to have), Action (to make/do), and Affection (to suffer or undergo). So prior to this though I don't really grasp his distinction of being in a subject and being predicated truly of a subject.


Why should we accept this as the primary categories and Substance as the ultimate one?

Substance is defined as that which neither can be predicated of anything nor be said to be in anything. Hence, this particular man or that particular tree are substances. Later in the text, Aristotle calls these particulars “primary substances”, to distinguish them from secondary substances, which are universals and can be predicated. Hence, Socrates is a primary substance, while man is a secondary substance. Man is predicated of Socrates, and therefore all that is predicated of man is predicated of Socrates. Quantity is the extension of an object, and may be either discrete or continuous. Further, its parts may or may not have relative positions to each other. All medieval discussions about the nature of the continuum, of the infinite and the infinitely divisible, are a long footnote to this text. It is of great importance in the development of mathematical ideas in the medieval and late Scholastic period. Quality is a determination which characterizes the nature of an object. Relation is the way in which one object may be related to another. Place is Position in relation to the surrounding environment. Time is position in relation to the course of events. Now with Position itself Aristotle gives examples which indicate that he meant a condition of rest resulting from an action: ‘Lying’, ‘sitting’. Thus position may be taken as the end point for the corresponding action. The term is, however, frequently taken to mean the relative position of the parts of an object (usually a living object), given that the position of the parts is inseparable from the state of rest implied.

The State is what he meant as a condition of rest resulting from an affection (i.e. being acted on): ‘shod’, ‘armed’. The term is often taken to mean the determination arising from the physical parts of an object: one's shoes, one's arms, etc. Traditionally, this category is also called a habitus (from Latin habere, “to have”). For the category Action it is the production of change in some other object and this is a pretty straightforward notion. Finally the Affection is the reception of change from some other object. It is also known as passivity. It is clear from the examples Aristotle gave for action and for affection that action is to affection as the active voice is to the passive. Thus for action he gave the example, ‘to lance’, ‘to cauterize’; for affection, ‘to be lanced’, ‘to be cauterized.’ The term is frequently misinterpreted to refer only or mainly to some kind of emotion or passion.

Aristotle's De Interpretatione

The De Interpretatione presents a very thorough account on language, going through nouns, verbs, propositions, and how truth values tie into these propositions with universals and a single affirmation. So both nouns and verbs don't really have any direct meaning by themselves, but when connected they say something about the world. Aristotle makes the point that we should only be concerned with propositions because the other forms of expression such as prayer are for poets and the like.

He spends the next few chapters discussing what we would call quantifiers (some, every, no, all) and how without these statements are general and both the affirmation and the negation are true and false. This discussion is fairly straightforward and technical. At this point in the book he is mapping out all of his distinctions in which he will bring it to a point and so developing his theory of language and meaning. Although it has been pointed out that his discussion in the Categories and De Interpretatione are more focused on objects in the world, and we can conclude this because that is what he constantly comes back to is saying something about these objects. He wonders what does all this mean for objects in reality? This is probably because he puts us as the primary substances. All essence is within us, so why would he be overly concerned with anything outside of ourselves.

The first five chapters deal with the terms that form propositions. Chapters 6 and 7 deal with the relationship between affirmative, negative, universal and particular propositions. These relationships are the basis of the well-known square of opposition. The distinction between universal and particular propositions is the basis of modern quantification theory The last three chapters deal with modalities. Chapter 9 is famous for the discussion of the sea-battle. (If it is true that there will be a sea-battle tomorrow, then it is true today that there will be a sea-battle. Thus a sea-battle is apparently unavoidable, and thus necessary).

Plato's Sophist

The Sophist starts off in the most obvious way, by exploring and trying to get at what a sophist is. I will try my best to explain this dialogue but I found it really involved and confusing. The argumentation is much more intellectual and complex it seems than the Cratylus or other dialogues I have read. At first he starts with the use of a mundane model (Angler), which shares some qualities in common with the target kind (Sophist). This common quality is the certain expertise (techne) at one subject. Then through the method of collection of different kinds (farming, caring for mortal bodies, for things that are put together or fabricated and imitation) he tries to bring them together into one kind, which he calls productive art. The same is true with the collection of learning, recognition, commerce, combat and hunting, which can be deduced into the kind of acquisitive art. From this he compares the model word and the target kind mapping out their likenesses and differences.

(Working) Outline - Paper on Meaning

• Thesis: In this exploration of both Plato’s and Aristotle’s views on language and meaning I will show how Aristotle provides a progression from Plato’s views in alteration of Forms, placement of meaning, and THIS WAY. By mapping out Plato’s view (in the Sophist and Cratylus) and then working through Aristotle’s (in the De Interpretatione and De Anime) it will be apparent the differences and how it is a progression and improvement, although in not everyway.
  
  

***Use primaries as basis for arguments and secondary to back up as well****

Part 1: Plato's basic philosophies leading into his views on language and meaning
-PRIMARY SOURCES to present his view
-Use Denyer, researched articles, and other books to discuss problems with his view

Part 2: Aristotle's views on language and meaning
-PRIMARY to start out with
-Use Modrak, articles, and really illustrate how he follows yet alters Plato's view
-Also issues found, problems with some of his arguments


CONCLUSION?

Working Bibliography

Bluck, R. S. "False Statement in the Sophist." The Journal of Hellenic Studies 77 (1957): 181-86. JSTOR. Olin Library, Winter Park. 6 Apr. 2009
.

Fine, Gail. "Plato on Naming." Philosophical Quarterly 27 (01 Oct. 1977): 289-301. Philosopher's Index. EBSCO. Olin Library, Winter Park, FL. 9 Apr. 2009

Gross, Alan G, and Marcelo Dascal.. "The Conceptual Unity of Aristotle's Rhetoric." Philosophy and Rhetoric 34.4 (01 Jan. 2001): 275-291. Philosopher's Index. EBSCO. Olin Library, Winter Park, FL. 9 Apr. 2009

Gluer, Kathrin, and Peter Pagin.. "Proper Names and Relational Modality." Linguistics and Philosophy 29.5 (01 Jan. 2006): 507-535. Philosopher's Index. EBSCO. Olin Library, Winter Park, FL. 10 Apr. 2009

Plato's Cratylus

So this is a very important piece of work in understanding Plato's view on language, it doesn't fully explain it but it is important in its discussion of naming. Socrates and Hermogenes spend much of their time in this dialogue breaking down names of People, Gods, and things (like fire, justice) which brings them to the conclusion that their must be secondary names and primary names. I wasn't quite sure if Socrates had really come to a conclusion about what is primary because they both seemed to agree that it could be possible to use a single letter to indicate one particular thing. Also they decide that there must be a name-bearer or a Legislator who originally created these names. From this discussion we see in the end of Cratylus that because the Legislator gives names he must have prior knowledge to them therefore the truth is God gave language. Therefore we must know things without words.

What they definitely conclude though is that a name is a representation of a thing, but moreso like an image not a direct representation. We find in his dialogue with Cratylus that if it was a direct representation "then how ridiculous would be the effect of names on things, if they were exactly the same with them! For they would be the doubles of them, and no one would be able to determine which were the names of which were the realities." (Cratylus 221) What is so interesting about this discussion of names to me is that it sounds so similar to Bertrand Russell and his theory of descriptions in that a name is not just a signifier but it is a description in disguise and this is what he uses to explain how we can talk of non-existent things (such as Unicorns or a bald King of France). Obviously the difference lies in that Plato doesn't take this more descriptive route, but we can see elements of it, for example in his explanation of Athene, "the author of it wished to identify this Goddess with moral intelligence, and therefore gave her the name; which however, either he or his successors have altered into what they thought a nicer form, and called her Athene." (Cratylus 196).

Book Review Beginning

This book Language, Thought and Falsehood is about how it is possible to think or speak about things that are not so or falsehood, basically making false statements or judgements. It stands as a great introductory tool to these ideas of language in ancient philosopher, and presents a great historic background of philosophers leading up to Plato. During this time period, language was viewed as a tool for naming, and so sentences and words (all these aspects of language) name objects in the world. From the viewpoint of language as ‘naming’ we find it very difficult to accept falsehood as existing. For falsehood can’t be failing to name things correctly, meaning the failure to designate what one was attempting to designate.

We find this is what Euthydemus was getting at with his argument against false speech in Plato’s Euthydemus. False speech does require one to be able to identify the object that the false claims are about. So this is what Plato’s Sophist is getting at with the realization that there is more to language than just naming. With this Denyer is arguing that Plato is able to once and for all solve the question of how falsehood is possible. In this book review I will give a general summary of Denyer’s chapters leading up to his section “The Being of What is Not” and “Names, Verbs and Sentences”. I will analyze Denyer’s interpretations and arguments in detail accompanied by the primary text, Plato’s Sophist, to come to a conclusion about the viability of his thesis.

The book begins with Plato’s Euthydemus presenting how someone might argue against falsehood and illustrates how in the end this argument falls apart. Denyer admits that Euthydemus is right to suppose that speech needs some sort of causal connection with existing things. It is the fact that even when the two possible subject matters( for example: Socrates or Socrates’ wisdom) are considered neither of them fully accept all of Euthydemus’ steps of his argument. So rejecting falsehood can’t work because it is still a huge part of language. The basis for this lies in the fact that Euthydemus’ argument relies on many assumptions such as falsehood is impossible and statements name facts to push the discussion. So from this exploration of Euthydemus we see that by taking away these assumptions he has an argument with no foundation. This is precisely why in the next chapter he presents Plato’s contemporaries and their varied attempts of an explanation of why falsehood doesn’t work. This chapter really provides us with great, illuminating accounts, outside of Plato, against falsehood’s existence leading into the discussion of Plato and Sophist.

Denyer Notes, Chapter 1

Truth and Falsehood
Problems with Truth

• Problem of the External World: I have beliefs about this external world, and each belief implies that something exists external to me. Could there be nothing than myself?

• Problem of Other Minds: I believe that there are other things out there that hold their own beliefs and have emotion responses and even rationality. Any of this TRUE? Other people could be sentient robots or a mere extension of myself.

• Problem of the Reality of the Past: I believe that the world has been going on for a while, but it is possible that the world could have been created five minutes ago, then there would be no truth in these beliefs of mine.

• Problem of Induction: I extrapolate about the future using my beliefs and knowledge of the past, yet these extrapolations could be completely false

• CONCLUSION: “Beliefs are guilty until proved innocent, untrue until proved true.”

-Many Ancient Philosophers such as Aristotle and Plato did not succumb to this prejudice that there are false beliefs. On the contrary, Plato spent much of his skill and energy illustrating how we make false statements and have false beliefs.

-Modern Philosophers on the other hand have spent so much time devising and developing a long and sophisticated argument that they are hesitant to give up their claims and accept that some beliefs are false.

Realism and Idealism

Idealism: doctrine that there is nothing but ideas (perceptions and thoughts), and possibly minds or spirits that have them.

• Ancient Philosophers do not even take it upon themselves to accept or even deny Idealism because it just does not fit into the belief system of ancient times to consider it. For them “planets are gods” and so such beliefs would be hard to defend under Idealist terms.

• This is definitely a more modern philosophical discussion because it is a real option. A common pattern is to accept an aspect of Idealism, but the Realism of ordinary life can't be false because the Idealism that is true is transcendental. This brings to mind Kant's distinction between Transcendental and Empirical truths.

-At this point I don't really agree because the Ancient Philosophers did believe that we have our own ideas and that they can be true with no empirical, objective evidence outside of ourselves. I don't think they were extreme Idealists, but Plato did believe in Forms that even our Ideas were trying to become (not to anthropomorphize them). Then again, they weren't complete Realists as he purports, and he may just be basing this on later Ancients like Aristotle. If he is then shame on him because there is a much wider scope.


A Difficulty

He asks, “If modern philosophical problems are typically problems of truth, how can I expect to interest modern readers in the problem of falsehood?”No problem here, Plato provides a solution to how we can provide without paradox a false belief. Worth it to examine to philosophies of those who felt that falsehood is still an issue.

• Falsehood unproblematic poses other problems: Why did Plato spend so much time proving falsehood?

• Once questions are answered they are no longer considered philosophical, but falsehood even though answered remains in the realm of philosophy

I say this is because even though falsehood is explained we are nowhere near understanding truth itself. Also, “How can one say something if it isn't true, and thus isn't there to be said?” Just because something is false doesn't deny its existence?

• Looking at the problem of falsehood, we might learn something from ancient views about thought and language that will help solve modern issues of truth.

• The reason being that some ancient philosophers incorporated falsehood into their theories of truth and thus helping us examine the modern issues of truth and our assumptions that made is so problematic.

Sedley's Plato on Language

So Plato views langauge as a matter of names and descriptions, which could be described in modern terms of subject and predicates. The reason why we can't completely accept this is because Plato is mainly concerned with single terms which he wants to define. So a better modern day term would be nouns and verbs because in a sense that is what he is referring to. He definitely views language to be of utmost importance because Sedley describes it as a

"privileged means to philosophy, and thereby to the soul's salvation" (p.214).

So back to sentence structures, to utter a complete sentence we must name the subject and go on describing it. Beyond these two types of words the only other one Plato explores is the negation sign "not". Sedley explains though that this makes sense with the analysis of falsity in the Sophist.

So in the Cratylus, the best words are the ones that present a whole combination of messages creating a complex idea with one word. So, with the word 'Sun' it represents assembling people by its rising, always rolling around the earth, and finally by its motion gives variety to the things that grow on Earth. Already we can see how easily complex one word in a language can be, and this is only a name. So Plato claims that a name provides two things, instruction and separation of being. Instruction meaning the function of a name is the highest good it can bring about. This just follows the language Plato uses of Highest Good as a main goal in life. The Separating Being aspect of a name is basically marking off an object from all other things.

Plato also believes that with each name comes a Form of Name, which in turn comes with a Form for each Name itself like Form of the Name of Man. This is obviously very ontologically committed and filling, maybe an unlimited number of Forms could exist? Beyond this though, does this me that one Form of a Name is better than another? If each name in different languages for chair are basically the same, why bother having them, based on Plato's theory of Form?So I guess each language has its own set of Forms of Names that it uses language to move towards its perfection.

Hermogenes makes the claim that due to different conventions in one village they could use the word for 'man' in place for the word for 'horse'. Plato doesn't make any room for convention because of his specific rules for names. He claims that

"names are tools with a specific instructive function and therefore requires expert manufacture" (p.220)

Plato only makes room for convention in two situations. One is words that have an equal proportion of appropriate and inappropriate descriptive sounds. He uses the example of the word 'hardness' in Greek, which contains two sounds one conveying 'hardness' and the other 'softness'. The only way to solve this is to look at conventional ways in which the word is used. The second case is with names of numbers. I can't explain this very well because I don't really see how names of numbers can't be understood by his rules for what a name is. He claims something about how large numbers need to be conventionally understood.

So Sedley asks again the question "How can a dialectician be confident that the word currently up for definition is so firmly tied to a single properly demarcated concept that defining the word will lead to an understanding of the concept?" (p.222). Plato's Socrates responds to this in the Meno with the theory that the soul already possesses knowledge a priori (before birth), when we were born we forgot, and then throughout life we spend our time "recollecting" through the course of learning. I am not sure how well this really answers his question, but maybe it does. Of course we would be able to firmly tie a word with its definition to a concept because everyone already knows the firm definition of the concept. It is a matter of realizing it.

The problem I have with this theory is that there is so much room for error. Anytime I bring up how people could easily get things wrong with language, Plato would just respond well they just haven't fully recollected its Form of Name and its Form. Seems like too easy of a solution and obviously this universe must be FULL of Forms. We might need a few more universes.

The last section Sedley brings up Equivocation, which is using a word in a sentence but with varied meaning, and Synonyms. So what about words that are synonymous? No problem for Plato because it seems to cause no harm to the map of reality and we easily grasp synonymous responses. More specifically, Plato says that synonymous words all participate in the same Name-Form and thus have the same 'power'. Equivocation isn't an issue either because Plato views the world's objects each having an ultimate form, so for each many there must be an ultimate One. I am not sure if this really solves this issue of one word with multiple meanings rather it shows how Plato just ignored this issue altogether. Sedley goes into other possible arguments Plato might make based on short passages, but I think these might be somewhat of a stretch.

Permenides a Logical Atomist??

So Tilghman in Parmenides, Plato, and Logical Atomism tries to bring Parmenides theory within the context of Russell's theory of descriptions and language. He says that Parmenides had both a theory of meaning for words and sentences. His theory of meaning basically states that

"the meaning of an expression is what it names or denotes. If an expression does not denote anything it is meaningless, hence no expression apparently denoting a non-existent somewhat, "that which is-not," can be intelligible." p.153

This theory of meaning is central to his philosophy in that words are names and sentences are states of affairs. By applying this sentence meaning though it makes it harder for Parminedes to argue that the world is unchanging and homogeneous. Also embedded in each statement about change is a non-existent state of affair such as referring to the past in the statement "Jones is now fat." Implying both that Jones is now fat, but that at a certain time in the past fatness did not exist.

Tilghman's solution is to add a theory of prediction to Parminedes theory of meaning. So if we can talk about the various possibilities it allows us to discuss non-existent states of affairs. This seems to sum it up quite nicely for him, but I would have to disagree. He falls into an existential slum because everything is "equally meaningless" thus is homogeneous. Weird.

Mason's Parmenides and Language

So Parminedes view of mortal language is that we distinguish opposites and establish signs, and less specifically names for individuals; through his poems he implies this is erroneous or mistaken. Plato makes the point that "'the possibility and power of dialectic' depends upon individuation, without this indentification we could not make sense of each other. Parmenides isn't saying people can't make sense of one another, but merely that one cannot claim that mortals are speaking about reality. It is somewhat chronologically out of sync to suggest this, but he would agree with the view that the possibility of sense is unrelated to the success of reference. It must be understood though that in no way does this imply that he had some sort of ancient theory of meaning pertaining to language. It is a huge step to go from saying that Parminedes believed mortal language is misleading to saying that he believed it is meaningless because it has no reference.

Nussbaum believes that the true object of reference is in the goddess's discourse, but with the many individual references made in the discourse it is hard to push this argument for

"if 'nothing in the sensible world' can be a 'possible object of speech and thought' then even the goddess should not be able to make sense of her talk about the mares and the house." (p152)

From her discourses, it is argued that Parmenides never claimed that language is meaningless, thus he can't be accused of contradiction by making the goddess use the same mortal language. Gallop also suggests that she can speak correctly and truthfully because she is a goddess. Along those same lines, Reinhardt believes that the contrast should be made in terms of truth instead of meaningfulness. Mainly what we are trying to get to is solving how the goddess's discourses get beyond condemnation of other statements. Mason offers three possible solutions to this troubling issue. First, he suggests one view where positive statements about reality are allowable where as negative statements (false) are not. The most obvious response to this argument is that Parmenides wasn't making this distinction rather it was all language that pertained to individuation. This seems to bring about the case that no statement is a right one, and that Parmenides may have gone to far in making any kind of language impossible.

The next two views are about the same in that they don't present us with a viable answer to what the goddess is even saying. I keep wondering though, isn't it part of the goddess's job to be deceptive? Also, Parmenides points out that it is impossible to describe the REAL reality in linguistic terms because our language is based in the illusory world. So I think that the goddess's statements are perfectly explainable. She must communicate through our language so in doing so the faults with our language will be reflected in her own statements. She is merely showing us our own faults in our beliefs. So we err in our individuation and predications in our use of language and so

"[Our] alleged errors are therefore not basically linguistic, but derive from erroneous beliefs: for example, about the non-connectedness of things." p.155

Parmenides' View

He was born about 515 and was possibly a student of Xenophanes and studied with Pythagoreans. He is said to be one of the most controversial figures among the presocratics. He says that genuine thought and knowledge can be only about what is, for what is not is literally unsayable and unthinkable. What IS must be whole, complete, unchanging and one. In response to claiming the changing world is unreal, he gives us a cosmological account by a goddes named Doxa (beliefs/opinions) who claims to be deceptive in her account. He basically takes the Heraclitus view to the extreme in that everything is one in the same. Instead of in flux, everything is unchanging because it is one in the same and it is an unreal human distinction to think otherwise.

Straightforwardly, he gives us four characteristics of Being: imperishable, pure presence/eternal, unchanging, and all together/one/continuous. This Being is only accessible to pure thinking. Again, this view may seem the most far-fetched and bizarre, but it must be understood that he was one of the first philosopher's to separate his philosophical works as a conceptual analyst from real life experience. It would be a bad idea to try to live out his concepts. It wouldn't work in the slightest. I find it very courageous for him to take on such a philosophically radical concept in that it was so different from any of the other presocratics. I definitely see how Plato's forms were influenced by this theory of Being, he just took the one continuous Being and made them into many continuous unchanging Beings.

Heraclitus's View

He decided to take the Milesian World View and completely eliminate Being or Arche all together. He is an anarchist (literally meaning one who denies existence of a first principle) in a sense because he believes that nothing is stable, nothing endures. He suggests that our use of language might suggest a somewhat ontological dualism such as when we say rabbit it refers to the rabbit in front of us but also all rabbits. If our language is deceptive and nothing is stable how than be any rational account of this constantly changing reality? He persists in saying that “this logos always is but human beings fail to understand it” (p.34). For him though there is no timeless truths, there is no “right now”. These contradictions, riddles he points out are truth-giving for him, sort of like Zen Buddhist koans (Impossible to step into the same river twice).

Where I actually find a serious contradiction is in his view of logos. If he thinks that their is no arche or Being for nothing persists or endures. Life is ever-changing. He does say that logos rules and guides the cosmos, for it is a single, unchanging law. Also that there is a divine link between logos and the souls of human beings. Through this he claims that there is a possibility of acquiring sure and certain knowledge. So, he believes that we live in a constant flux, but beyond it there is something unchanging? This seems to be beyond contradiction and just plain fallacious argumentatively.