Aristotle's Categories

So I began reading Categories and immediately realized that it is the most confusing ancient text I have read in a while. At least Plato had nice dialogues that had some humor. Luckily, that link you sent me Rubarth helped immensely. One particular thing I don't really grasp right away is when he talks about 'accidental' and 'non-accidental'. "Beings that are present-in others are accidental, while those that are not present-in others are non-accidental." That is from the website not the text. So if you could help me understand that one part that would be wonderful.

Classifications:
(1) accidental universals; (2) essential universals; (3) accidental particulars; (4) non-accidental particulars

Studtmann's distinction of universals and particulars is debated, although it is accepted by Aristotle's Medieval interpreters, by G.E.L. Owen. "Owen argues, a being that is not said-of but present-in primary substances is an accidental universal of the lowest possible generality." I am not sure what Owen means by this. This distinction still seems really vague to me and not very well mapped out.

So for the rest of Categories, Aristotle discusses his ten-fold distinction of 'what is said', which also distinguishes as words. But in that webpage you sent me they argue that he is more concerned about objects in this world because Aristotle explicitly accepts a doctrine of meaning according to which words conventionally signify concepts, and concepts naturally signify objects in the world, so he is ultimately driven by his concerns of objects of this world.

The Ten Categories he creates is as follows: Substance (essence or substance), Quantity (how much), Quality (of what kind or quality), Relation (toward something), Place (where), Time (when), Position (to lie), State (to have), Action (to make/do), and Affection (to suffer or undergo). So prior to this though I don't really grasp his distinction of being in a subject and being predicated truly of a subject.


Why should we accept this as the primary categories and Substance as the ultimate one?

Substance is defined as that which neither can be predicated of anything nor be said to be in anything. Hence, this particular man or that particular tree are substances. Later in the text, Aristotle calls these particulars “primary substances”, to distinguish them from secondary substances, which are universals and can be predicated. Hence, Socrates is a primary substance, while man is a secondary substance. Man is predicated of Socrates, and therefore all that is predicated of man is predicated of Socrates. Quantity is the extension of an object, and may be either discrete or continuous. Further, its parts may or may not have relative positions to each other. All medieval discussions about the nature of the continuum, of the infinite and the infinitely divisible, are a long footnote to this text. It is of great importance in the development of mathematical ideas in the medieval and late Scholastic period. Quality is a determination which characterizes the nature of an object. Relation is the way in which one object may be related to another. Place is Position in relation to the surrounding environment. Time is position in relation to the course of events. Now with Position itself Aristotle gives examples which indicate that he meant a condition of rest resulting from an action: ‘Lying’, ‘sitting’. Thus position may be taken as the end point for the corresponding action. The term is, however, frequently taken to mean the relative position of the parts of an object (usually a living object), given that the position of the parts is inseparable from the state of rest implied.

The State is what he meant as a condition of rest resulting from an affection (i.e. being acted on): ‘shod’, ‘armed’. The term is often taken to mean the determination arising from the physical parts of an object: one's shoes, one's arms, etc. Traditionally, this category is also called a habitus (from Latin habere, “to have”). For the category Action it is the production of change in some other object and this is a pretty straightforward notion. Finally the Affection is the reception of change from some other object. It is also known as passivity. It is clear from the examples Aristotle gave for action and for affection that action is to affection as the active voice is to the passive. Thus for action he gave the example, ‘to lance’, ‘to cauterize’; for affection, ‘to be lanced’, ‘to be cauterized.’ The term is frequently misinterpreted to refer only or mainly to some kind of emotion or passion.