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Tuesday, April 28, 2009
De Anima
This is a very interesting text because it seems that Aristotle is pretty confident he can outline what a soul is and its many qualities. This is all based on the fact that the soul must lie in the body because it is inseparable. One cannot move the soul separate from the body, so any movement of the body is a movement of the soul. So he spends the first book of De Anime going through various Presocratic views of the soul, which because the soul moves it self must be the primary substance whether that be water, fire, air, or something else. Throughout this book I kept expecting him to assert his own view, but he was just trying to present all the views that don't work so in the second book he can start a completely new view of the soul from scratch.
Thursday, April 23, 2009
Roochnik: Aristotle
We find here that although Aristotle is a student of Plato, he greatly differs in his relationship with the Presocratics and their study of nature. Whereas Plato is primarily considered with studying logoi, of what human beings have to say, he studies nature, but he also takes the influence of Plato with him by including Forms and his concern for the best possible human life. He took these forms and brought them down to earth and although they still bear the weight of objective truth they are not ontologically separate from particulars. So Aristotle's view of forms will definitely be explored throughout this chapter of Roochnik. It is structured where first he addresses Aristotle's conception of nature, second will discuss his psychology, and the final two sections will treat Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics and his Politics, the works he most directly developed the legacy of Platonism.
What he means in saying "Of beings, some are by nature, while others are by other causes" is that some beings move themselves, in the sense of the Presocratics arche (first principle) in that I am the origin of my own movement. No external force needs to be applied to me because I have desires and move toward what I want, although I can be affected by external forces. A sort of change is the self-originated natural motion he is referring to, such as decay or growth or my hair turning grey. For change to be natural though it must emmanate from a living being, so the example he gives is the construction of a house and the wear and tear and repair it goes through over time. All of its change is due to external forces. Whereas my aging may have some alterations due to external forces, but it all stems from inside me. But it isn't just living things that he refers to as natural. He also talks of simple bodies which are earth, fire, air, water and each of these lifeless bodies have a principle of motion and rest in themselves. For example without other force fire and air would move upward toward its natural place in the heavens above whereas earth and water would move downward.
From all this we can see that Aristotle's worldview is a "Cosmos", a limited, hierarchical organized world where its center is the earth and its zenith is in the perfectly circular orbit of the fixed stars. One aspect I found really interesting here is the four causes which I had not previously heard of. So we have the "material cause" which answers the question what is this made of, then the "formal cause" which answers what is it, the efficient cause which answers what moved or produced it (this is closer to our modern day view of cause), and "final cause" is something's goal, purpose or end (telos) and it answers what is it for (his example is health which is understood as the 'end' of walking. So we can say that these causes are an indicator of the way we speak about causes and from Aristotle's perspective a good grasp of the reality of causes.
So this is the general sort of scope for his conception of nature that I was given starting out with Roochnick, but the rest of his chapter on Aristotle dives into his Ethics and Politics which are interesting and only somewhat helpful to my final project.
From all this we can see that Aristotle's worldview is a "Cosmos", a limited, hierarchical organized world where its center is the earth and its zenith is in the perfectly circular orbit of the fixed stars. One aspect I found really interesting here is the four causes which I had not previously heard of. So we have the "material cause" which answers the question what is this made of, then the "formal cause" which answers what is it, the efficient cause which answers what moved or produced it (this is closer to our modern day view of cause), and "final cause" is something's goal, purpose or end (telos) and it answers what is it for (his example is health which is understood as the 'end' of walking. So we can say that these causes are an indicator of the way we speak about causes and from Aristotle's perspective a good grasp of the reality of causes.
So this is the general sort of scope for his conception of nature that I was given starting out with Roochnick, but the rest of his chapter on Aristotle dives into his Ethics and Politics which are interesting and only somewhat helpful to my final project.
Wednesday, April 22, 2009
Aristotle's Categories
So I began reading Categories and immediately realized that it is the most confusing ancient text I have read in a while. At least Plato had nice dialogues that had some humor. Luckily, that link you sent me Rubarth helped immensely. One particular thing I don't really grasp right away is when he talks about 'accidental' and 'non-accidental'. "Beings that are present-in others are accidental, while those that are not present-in others are non-accidental." That is from the website not the text. So if you could help me understand that one part that would be wonderful.
Classifications:
(1) accidental universals; (2) essential universals; (3) accidental particulars; (4) non-accidental particulars
Studtmann's distinction of universals and particulars is debated, although it is accepted by Aristotle's Medieval interpreters, by G.E.L. Owen. "Owen argues, a being that is not said-of but present-in primary substances is an accidental universal of the lowest possible generality." I am not sure what Owen means by this. This distinction still seems really vague to me and not very well mapped out.
So for the rest of Categories, Aristotle discusses his ten-fold distinction of 'what is said', which also distinguishes as words. But in that webpage you sent me they argue that he is more concerned about objects in this world because Aristotle explicitly accepts a doctrine of meaning according to which words conventionally signify concepts, and concepts naturally signify objects in the world, so he is ultimately driven by his concerns of objects of this world.
The Ten Categories he creates is as follows: Substance (essence or substance), Quantity (how much), Quality (of what kind or quality), Relation (toward something), Place (where), Time (when), Position (to lie), State (to have), Action (to make/do), and Affection (to suffer or undergo). So prior to this though I don't really grasp his distinction of being in a subject and being predicated truly of a subject.
Why should we accept this as the primary categories and Substance as the ultimate one?
Substance is defined as that which neither can be predicated of anything nor be said to be in anything. Hence, this particular man or that particular tree are substances. Later in the text, Aristotle calls these particulars “primary substances”, to distinguish them from secondary substances, which are universals and can be predicated. Hence, Socrates is a primary substance, while man is a secondary substance. Man is predicated of Socrates, and therefore all that is predicated of man is predicated of Socrates. Quantity is the extension of an object, and may be either discrete or continuous. Further, its parts may or may not have relative positions to each other. All medieval discussions about the nature of the continuum, of the infinite and the infinitely divisible, are a long footnote to this text. It is of great importance in the development of mathematical ideas in the medieval and late Scholastic period. Quality is a determination which characterizes the nature of an object. Relation is the way in which one object may be related to another. Place is Position in relation to the surrounding environment. Time is position in relation to the course of events. Now with Position itself Aristotle gives examples which indicate that he meant a condition of rest resulting from an action: ‘Lying’, ‘sitting’. Thus position may be taken as the end point for the corresponding action. The term is, however, frequently taken to mean the relative position of the parts of an object (usually a living object), given that the position of the parts is inseparable from the state of rest implied.
The State is what he meant as a condition of rest resulting from an affection (i.e. being acted on): ‘shod’, ‘armed’. The term is often taken to mean the determination arising from the physical parts of an object: one's shoes, one's arms, etc. Traditionally, this category is also called a habitus (from Latin habere, “to have”). For the category Action it is the production of change in some other object and this is a pretty straightforward notion. Finally the Affection is the reception of change from some other object. It is also known as passivity. It is clear from the examples Aristotle gave for action and for affection that action is to affection as the active voice is to the passive. Thus for action he gave the example, ‘to lance’, ‘to cauterize’; for affection, ‘to be lanced’, ‘to be cauterized.’ The term is frequently misinterpreted to refer only or mainly to some kind of emotion or passion.
Classifications:
(1) accidental universals; (2) essential universals; (3) accidental particulars; (4) non-accidental particulars
Studtmann's distinction of universals and particulars is debated, although it is accepted by Aristotle's Medieval interpreters, by G.E.L. Owen. "Owen argues, a being that is not said-of but present-in primary substances is an accidental universal of the lowest possible generality." I am not sure what Owen means by this. This distinction still seems really vague to me and not very well mapped out.
So for the rest of Categories, Aristotle discusses his ten-fold distinction of 'what is said', which also distinguishes as words. But in that webpage you sent me they argue that he is more concerned about objects in this world because Aristotle explicitly accepts a doctrine of meaning according to which words conventionally signify concepts, and concepts naturally signify objects in the world, so he is ultimately driven by his concerns of objects of this world.
The Ten Categories he creates is as follows: Substance (essence or substance), Quantity (how much), Quality (of what kind or quality), Relation (toward something), Place (where), Time (when), Position (to lie), State (to have), Action (to make/do), and Affection (to suffer or undergo). So prior to this though I don't really grasp his distinction of being in a subject and being predicated truly of a subject.
Why should we accept this as the primary categories and Substance as the ultimate one?
Substance is defined as that which neither can be predicated of anything nor be said to be in anything. Hence, this particular man or that particular tree are substances. Later in the text, Aristotle calls these particulars “primary substances”, to distinguish them from secondary substances, which are universals and can be predicated. Hence, Socrates is a primary substance, while man is a secondary substance. Man is predicated of Socrates, and therefore all that is predicated of man is predicated of Socrates. Quantity is the extension of an object, and may be either discrete or continuous. Further, its parts may or may not have relative positions to each other. All medieval discussions about the nature of the continuum, of the infinite and the infinitely divisible, are a long footnote to this text. It is of great importance in the development of mathematical ideas in the medieval and late Scholastic period. Quality is a determination which characterizes the nature of an object. Relation is the way in which one object may be related to another. Place is Position in relation to the surrounding environment. Time is position in relation to the course of events. Now with Position itself Aristotle gives examples which indicate that he meant a condition of rest resulting from an action: ‘Lying’, ‘sitting’. Thus position may be taken as the end point for the corresponding action. The term is, however, frequently taken to mean the relative position of the parts of an object (usually a living object), given that the position of the parts is inseparable from the state of rest implied.
The State is what he meant as a condition of rest resulting from an affection (i.e. being acted on): ‘shod’, ‘armed’. The term is often taken to mean the determination arising from the physical parts of an object: one's shoes, one's arms, etc. Traditionally, this category is also called a habitus (from Latin habere, “to have”). For the category Action it is the production of change in some other object and this is a pretty straightforward notion. Finally the Affection is the reception of change from some other object. It is also known as passivity. It is clear from the examples Aristotle gave for action and for affection that action is to affection as the active voice is to the passive. Thus for action he gave the example, ‘to lance’, ‘to cauterize’; for affection, ‘to be lanced’, ‘to be cauterized.’ The term is frequently misinterpreted to refer only or mainly to some kind of emotion or passion.
Tuesday, April 21, 2009
Aristotle's De Interpretatione
The De Interpretatione presents a very thorough account on language, going through nouns, verbs, propositions, and how truth values tie into these propositions with universals and a single affirmation. So both nouns and verbs don't really have any direct meaning by themselves, but when connected they say something about the world. Aristotle makes the point that we should only be concerned with propositions because the other forms of expression such as prayer are for poets and the like.
He spends the next few chapters discussing what we would call quantifiers (some, every, no, all) and how without these statements are general and both the affirmation and the negation are true and false. This discussion is fairly straightforward and technical. At this point in the book he is mapping out all of his distinctions in which he will bring it to a point and so developing his theory of language and meaning. Although it has been pointed out that his discussion in the Categories and De Interpretatione are more focused on objects in the world, and we can conclude this because that is what he constantly comes back to is saying something about these objects. He wonders what does all this mean for objects in reality? This is probably because he puts us as the primary substances. All essence is within us, so why would he be overly concerned with anything outside of ourselves.
The first five chapters deal with the terms that form propositions. Chapters 6 and 7 deal with the relationship between affirmative, negative, universal and particular propositions. These relationships are the basis of the well-known square of opposition. The distinction between universal and particular propositions is the basis of modern quantification theory The last three chapters deal with modalities. Chapter 9 is famous for the discussion of the sea-battle. (If it is true that there will be a sea-battle tomorrow, then it is true today that there will be a sea-battle. Thus a sea-battle is apparently unavoidable, and thus necessary).
He spends the next few chapters discussing what we would call quantifiers (some, every, no, all) and how without these statements are general and both the affirmation and the negation are true and false. This discussion is fairly straightforward and technical. At this point in the book he is mapping out all of his distinctions in which he will bring it to a point and so developing his theory of language and meaning. Although it has been pointed out that his discussion in the Categories and De Interpretatione are more focused on objects in the world, and we can conclude this because that is what he constantly comes back to is saying something about these objects. He wonders what does all this mean for objects in reality? This is probably because he puts us as the primary substances. All essence is within us, so why would he be overly concerned with anything outside of ourselves.
The first five chapters deal with the terms that form propositions. Chapters 6 and 7 deal with the relationship between affirmative, negative, universal and particular propositions. These relationships are the basis of the well-known square of opposition. The distinction between universal and particular propositions is the basis of modern quantification theory The last three chapters deal with modalities. Chapter 9 is famous for the discussion of the sea-battle. (If it is true that there will be a sea-battle tomorrow, then it is true today that there will be a sea-battle. Thus a sea-battle is apparently unavoidable, and thus necessary).
Wednesday, April 15, 2009
Plato's Sophist
The Sophist starts off in the most obvious way, by exploring and trying to get at what a sophist is. I will try my best to explain this dialogue but I found it really involved and confusing. The argumentation is much more intellectual and complex it seems than the Cratylus or other dialogues I have read. At first he starts with the use of a mundane model (Angler), which shares some qualities in common with the target kind (Sophist). This common quality is the certain expertise (techne) at one subject. Then through the method of collection of different kinds (farming, caring for mortal bodies, for things that are put together or fabricated and imitation) he tries to bring them together into one kind, which he calls productive art. The same is true with the collection of learning, recognition, commerce, combat and hunting, which can be deduced into the kind of acquisitive art. From this he compares the model word and the target kind mapping out their likenesses and differences.
Friday, April 10, 2009
(Working) Outline - Paper on Meaning
- Thesis: In this exploration of both Plato’s and Aristotle’s views on language and meaning I will show how Aristotle provides a progression from Plato’s views in alteration of Forms, placement of meaning, and THIS WAY. By mapping out Plato’s view (in the Sophist and Cratylus) and then working through Aristotle’s (in the De Interpretatione and De Anime) it will be apparent the differences and how it is a progression and improvement, although in not everyway.
Part 1: Plato's basic philosophies leading into his views on language and meaning
-PRIMARY SOURCES to present his view
-Use Denyer, researched articles, and other books to discuss problems with his view
Part 2: Aristotle's views on language and meaning
-PRIMARY to start out with
-Use Modrak, articles, and really illustrate how he follows yet alters Plato's view
-Also issues found, problems with some of his arguments
CONCLUSION?
Working Bibliography
Bluck, R. S. "False Statement in the Sophist." The Journal of Hellenic Studies 77 (1957): 181-86. JSTOR. Olin Library, Winter Park. 6 Apr. 2009
.
Fine, Gail. "Plato on Naming." Philosophical Quarterly 27 (01 Oct. 1977): 289-301. Philosopher's Index. EBSCO. Olin Library, Winter Park, FL. 9 Apr. 2009
Gross, Alan G, and Marcelo Dascal.. "The Conceptual Unity of Aristotle's Rhetoric." Philosophy and Rhetoric 34.4 (01 Jan. 2001): 275-291. Philosopher's Index. EBSCO. Olin Library, Winter Park, FL. 9 Apr. 2009
Gluer, Kathrin, and Peter Pagin.. "Proper Names and Relational Modality." Linguistics and Philosophy 29.5 (01 Jan. 2006): 507-535. Philosopher's Index. EBSCO. Olin Library, Winter Park, FL. 10 Apr. 2009
Fine, Gail. "Plato on Naming." Philosophical Quarterly 27 (01 Oct. 1977): 289-301. Philosopher's Index. EBSCO. Olin Library, Winter Park, FL. 9 Apr. 2009
Gross, Alan G, and Marcelo Dascal.. "The Conceptual Unity of Aristotle's Rhetoric." Philosophy and Rhetoric 34.4 (01 Jan. 2001): 275-291. Philosopher's Index. EBSCO. Olin Library, Winter Park, FL. 9 Apr. 2009
Gluer, Kathrin, and Peter Pagin.. "Proper Names and Relational Modality." Linguistics and Philosophy 29.5 (01 Jan. 2006): 507-535. Philosopher's Index. EBSCO. Olin Library, Winter Park, FL. 10 Apr. 2009
Tuesday, April 7, 2009
Plato's Cratylus
So this is a very important piece of work in understanding Plato's view on language, it doesn't fully explain it but it is important in its discussion of naming. Socrates and Hermogenes spend much of their time in this dialogue breaking down names of People, Gods, and things (like fire, justice) which brings them to the conclusion that their must be secondary names and primary names. I wasn't quite sure if Socrates had really come to a conclusion about what is primary because they both seemed to agree that it could be possible to use a single letter to indicate one particular thing. Also they decide that there must be a name-bearer or a Legislator who originally created these names. From this discussion we see in the end of Cratylus that because the Legislator gives names he must have prior knowledge to them therefore the truth is God gave language. Therefore we must know things without words.
What they definitely conclude though is that a name is a representation of a thing, but moreso like an image not a direct representation. We find in his dialogue with Cratylus that if it was a direct representation "then how ridiculous would be the effect of names on things, if they were exactly the same with them! For they would be the doubles of them, and no one would be able to determine which were the names of which were the realities." (Cratylus 221) What is so interesting about this discussion of names to me is that it sounds so similar to Bertrand Russell and his theory of descriptions in that a name is not just a signifier but it is a description in disguise and this is what he uses to explain how we can talk of non-existent things (such as Unicorns or a bald King of France). Obviously the difference lies in that Plato doesn't take this more descriptive route, but we can see elements of it, for example in his explanation of Athene, "the author of it wished to identify this Goddess with moral intelligence, and therefore gave her the name; which however, either he or his successors have altered into what they thought a nicer form, and called her Athene." (Cratylus 196).
What they definitely conclude though is that a name is a representation of a thing, but moreso like an image not a direct representation. We find in his dialogue with Cratylus that if it was a direct representation "then how ridiculous would be the effect of names on things, if they were exactly the same with them! For they would be the doubles of them, and no one would be able to determine which were the names of which were the realities." (Cratylus 221) What is so interesting about this discussion of names to me is that it sounds so similar to Bertrand Russell and his theory of descriptions in that a name is not just a signifier but it is a description in disguise and this is what he uses to explain how we can talk of non-existent things (such as Unicorns or a bald King of France). Obviously the difference lies in that Plato doesn't take this more descriptive route, but we can see elements of it, for example in his explanation of Athene, "the author of it wished to identify this Goddess with moral intelligence, and therefore gave her the name; which however, either he or his successors have altered into what they thought a nicer form, and called her Athene." (Cratylus 196).
Thursday, April 2, 2009
Book Review Beginning
This book Language, Thought and Falsehood is about how it is possible to think or speak about things that are not so or falsehood, basically making false statements or judgements. It stands as a great introductory tool to these ideas of language in ancient philosopher, and presents a great historic background of philosophers leading up to Plato. During this time period, language was viewed as a tool for naming, and so sentences and words (all these aspects of language) name objects in the world. From the viewpoint of language as ‘naming’ we find it very difficult to accept falsehood as existing. For falsehood can’t be failing to name things correctly, meaning the failure to designate what one was attempting to designate.
We find this is what Euthydemus was getting at with his argument against false speech in Plato’s Euthydemus. False speech does require one to be able to identify the object that the false claims are about. So this is what Plato’s Sophist is getting at with the realization that there is more to language than just naming. With this Denyer is arguing that Plato is able to once and for all solve the question of how falsehood is possible. In this book review I will give a general summary of Denyer’s chapters leading up to his section “The Being of What is Not” and “Names, Verbs and Sentences”. I will analyze Denyer’s interpretations and arguments in detail accompanied by the primary text, Plato’s Sophist, to come to a conclusion about the viability of his thesis.
The book begins with Plato’s Euthydemus presenting how someone might argue against falsehood and illustrates how in the end this argument falls apart. Denyer admits that Euthydemus is right to suppose that speech needs some sort of causal connection with existing things. It is the fact that even when the two possible subject matters( for example: Socrates or Socrates’ wisdom) are considered neither of them fully accept all of Euthydemus’ steps of his argument. So rejecting falsehood can’t work because it is still a huge part of language. The basis for this lies in the fact that Euthydemus’ argument relies on many assumptions such as falsehood is impossible and statements name facts to push the discussion. So from this exploration of Euthydemus we see that by taking away these assumptions he has an argument with no foundation. This is precisely why in the next chapter he presents Plato’s contemporaries and their varied attempts of an explanation of why falsehood doesn’t work. This chapter really provides us with great, illuminating accounts, outside of Plato, against falsehood’s existence leading into the discussion of Plato and Sophist.
We find this is what Euthydemus was getting at with his argument against false speech in Plato’s Euthydemus. False speech does require one to be able to identify the object that the false claims are about. So this is what Plato’s Sophist is getting at with the realization that there is more to language than just naming. With this Denyer is arguing that Plato is able to once and for all solve the question of how falsehood is possible. In this book review I will give a general summary of Denyer’s chapters leading up to his section “The Being of What is Not” and “Names, Verbs and Sentences”. I will analyze Denyer’s interpretations and arguments in detail accompanied by the primary text, Plato’s Sophist, to come to a conclusion about the viability of his thesis.
The book begins with Plato’s Euthydemus presenting how someone might argue against falsehood and illustrates how in the end this argument falls apart. Denyer admits that Euthydemus is right to suppose that speech needs some sort of causal connection with existing things. It is the fact that even when the two possible subject matters( for example: Socrates or Socrates’ wisdom) are considered neither of them fully accept all of Euthydemus’ steps of his argument. So rejecting falsehood can’t work because it is still a huge part of language. The basis for this lies in the fact that Euthydemus’ argument relies on many assumptions such as falsehood is impossible and statements name facts to push the discussion. So from this exploration of Euthydemus we see that by taking away these assumptions he has an argument with no foundation. This is precisely why in the next chapter he presents Plato’s contemporaries and their varied attempts of an explanation of why falsehood doesn’t work. This chapter really provides us with great, illuminating accounts, outside of Plato, against falsehood’s existence leading into the discussion of Plato and Sophist.
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